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QUESTIONING GOD’S OMNIPOTENCE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF 

LEIBNIZ’S THEODICY 

  

                                                Titus Awukane Afatang 

                                               Department of Philosophy 

                                   University of Uyo, Akwa-Ibom State, Nigeria 

 

                                                                    & 

                                                 Stephen Chibuikem Okeke 

                                                   Department of Philosophy, 

                             Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Anambra State, Nigeria. 

 

 

Abstract  

This study is a critical appraisal of Leibniz’s theodicy which centers on the perennial problem 

of evil in Philosophy. It investigated the claim of God’s omnipotence in Leibniz’s best 

possible world theory. The problem of evil consists in the attempt to reconcile the existence 

of a good and powerful God with the presence of evil in the world. This study explored the 

question of whether or not the presence of evil in the world serves as an evidence against 

God’s existence or any of the attributes traditionally ascribed to him by theists (all-powerful, 

all-loving, and all-knowing). The aim of this study was to examine Leibniz’s attempt at 

resolving the problem of evil through his theory of the best possible world. This study 

focused on an investigation of Leibniz’s claim to see whether or not the attribute of divine 

omnipotence is sustainable in the light of his theory since he claims that God allows some 

evil to take place so that greater good may be attained. This study sought a possible 

justification for the presence of evil in the world, and whether in fact evil is a “thing,” and 

whether it has great consequences for God’s existence. This study employed Criticism as its 

philosophical method of research. The major finding of the study is that Leibniz’s solution to 

the problem of evil is not entirely satisfactory since it leaves room for a number of questions. 

The study concluded that Leibniz’s position that God allows some evil to take place so that 

from them greater good may come about questions God’s omnipotence - although God is 

omnibenevolent and omniscient, he is not omnipotent.  

Key Words: Theodicy, Evil, Problem, Omnipotence, Appraisal. 

 

INTRODUCTION 

The question of evil and human suffering is a perennial one in philosophy. This 

question is particularly famous because of its connection with the theme of God - a central 

issue in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Religion. God’s benevolence is brought to 

scrutiny when the presence of evil in the world is considered. In some cases, and for certain 

scholars, the existence of God becomes controversial in the face of so much evil in the world. 

Undoubtedly, the problem of evil and the question of human suffering in the world have a 

whole lot of implications for the existence of God, and for the traditional attributes of God. 

This is so because the problem of evil has always surfaced as the bone of contention between 

theists and philosophers. While theists, aside believing in God uphold some fundamental 

attributes as being essential to God’s nature (such as goodness), some philosophers argue that 



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noticeable pain and suffering in the world is inconsistent with the nature of God as described 

by theists, and so, the reality of evil could even go beyond denying God and or a total 

dismissal of his existence. There is a problem as to how one can reconcile these two glaring 

contradictory facts: on the one hand that the world is put in place and sustained by a perfect 

being who is all-good and all-powerful, and on the other hand, that this same world is filled 

with so much evil. This problem therefore, is from evil: why should there be evil in a world 

supposedly created by a good God. 

Leibniz contends that evil and suffering are necessary for the greater good. In other 

words, suffering and evil are necessary parts of the divine plan. These aspects of the divine 

plan, in the opinion of Leibniz, serve as means to greater ends such as moral growth, spiritual 

development, and the realization of higher goods. Leibniz contends that God in his infinite 

wisdom, and through the principle of sufficient reason, has chosen to create this best possible 

world with evil and suffering in it. In other words, there is a harmony in the world between 

good and evil. 

Leibniz maintains the traditional attributes of God while proposing his best possible 

world theory. However, this raises a problem of God’s omnipotence. It is difficult to 

rationally accept God’s all-powerfulness considering Leibniz’s view that he allows some evil 

so that greater good might come about. However, this position that God, due to his nature 

would not allow any evil except there is a greater good which will issue from it is quite 

problematic in that it shows some form of limitation of the power of God. the fact that an all-

Good God would allow some evil to occur so that from it he can achieve greater good is an 

indication that “all-powerfulness” is wrongly attributed to him.  This study concludes that the 

affirmation of a God who is all-good and all-knowing but not all-powerful explains the 

existence of evil in the world.  

 

Brief Profile of Leibniz 

Leibniz was born in Leipzig on the first of July 1646. This was at the time when the thirty 

years war was coming to an end, the war which had ravaged the whole of central Europe at 

the time. One would not be surprised at the outstanding academic performance of Leibniz 

considering his background. He came from a Lutheran family which was part of the educated 

elites on both sides: his father Friedrich Leibniz was a jurist and a professor of moral 

philosophy at University of Leipzig and his mother Catharina Schmuck was the daughter of a 

professor of law. After the death of his father in 1652, he, his mother and his uncle directed 

his own education from then on. At an early age he was granted access to his father’s library 

and he took time to study the volumes of ancient history and the Church Fathers.  

In 1661 he began his formal university education at Leipzig; his philosophical training was 

chiefly scholastic in nature. He has some background in Renaissance Humanism. He met 

Jacob Thomasius at Leipzig, who influenced him greatly. Upon reception of his baccalaureate 

from Leipzig, he continued his education at the University of Altdorf where in 1666 he 

published Dissertation on the Art of Combinations (Dissertatio de arte combinatoria). 

Leibniz met with Baron Johan Christian von Boineburg who helped him secure a position 

with the Elector of Mainz. He composed a series of works in philosophical theology. Leibniz 

died on Novermber 14, 1716 

Clarification of Key Terms 

Omnipotence: This refers to the quality of having unlimited or very great power. This is a 

long-standing attribute of God as held by adherents of religion. it is an indication of the belief 



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that God’s power is unlimited and that God can do anything. This is one of the core beliefs of 

many monotheistic religions. This is a term used to express God’s all-powerfulness.  

Appraisal: This refers to the act of carrying out an assessment of something or someone. It 

means the act of estimating or judging the nature or value of something or someone. It is an 

examination that is done in order to determine the quality, success, or needs of someone or 

something.  

Theodicy: This is the vindication of divine providence in view of the existence of evil. This 

term was coined by the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in his 1710 work 

“Theodicies.” In the philosophy of Religion, theodicy means an argument that attempts to 

resolve the problem of evil that arises when all power and all goodness are predicated of God. 

This term is derived from ancient Greek (theos) which means God and (dike) which means 

justice. According to A. Laytner, theodicy is an attempt to justify or defend God in the face of 

evil. 

Evil:  In simple terms, the problem of evil refers to the philosophical challenge of reconciling 

the existence of evil and suffering with an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God. 

it is important to understand the concept of evil while engaging in the philosophical discourse 

on the problem of evil. Understanding the nature of evil is an advantage in resolving the 

problem of evil. As Plotinus notes “those inquiring whence evil enters into being, or rather 

into a certain order of beings would be making the best beginning if they established first of 

all, what precisely evil is” (Pourtless, 8). Marcus Singer notes that though evil is often used 

loosely as often the generic opposite of ‘morally good,’ used precisely, it is the worse 

possible term of opprobrium available (Singer, 185). R.F. Baumeister sees evil as an 

intentional interpersonal harm (Baumeister, 34). In the view of Smith Ferguson, evil can be 

divided into two complementary, yet distinctive categories: perverse (or instrumental) evil 

and pure evil. Perverse evil is the performance of evil acts under the guise of moral certitude 

or permittance. Pure evil is the performance of evil acts for their own sake (Ferguson, 6). In 

any case, evil has a number of dimensions. It refers to bad or unacceptable states of affairs 

which cause discomfort or pain.  

 

The Problem of Evil 

The problem of evil, as earlier stated, is a perennial one in philosophy. Although it 

may have been formulated in varying ways, the core of the problems remains the same – the 

difficulty of attributing “all-good” and “all-powerful” to God in the midst of evil in the world. 

generally, one can think of three main propositions which are presented in the argument of 

the problem of evil: (i)God is omnipotent; (ii) God is good; and, (iii) Evil exists. Having these 

three propositions together constitutes this problem because they are mutually contradictory, 

even though many people hold all three of them to be true (Walker, 25). In other words, while 

many people do not see a problem with having all three propositions stand as true, some 

philosophers think that it is unreasonable to be comfortable with all three put together. Why 

is it so? It is so because our reason tells us that if God is omniscient he should know under 

what circumstances evil will occur, and since he is omnipotent he should be able to prevent it 

from happening, but since orthodox theism presumes his willingness by ascribing to him the 

attribute of being loving, then there is a problem with regards to the veracity of the claim of 

his existence or of his possession of some of the qualities being attributed to him, like the 

attribute of omnipotence.  

Traditionally, orthodox theism takes some of these propositions for granted. Some 

scholars have identified five propositions which are taken for granted by traditional theism: 



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(i) God exists; (ii) God is omnipotent; (iii) God is omniscient; (iv) God is wholly good; and, 

(v) Evil exists. The conjunction of the above five propositions is exactly what philosophers 

find to be contradictory (Walker, 25).  Now, the attempts to defend God in the face of evil is 

referred to as a theodicy.  

 

A Glance at other attempts at resolving the Problem of Evil 

The ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus is often credited to be the first to state this 

problem clearly. He states that if God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then 

how can evil exist in a world made by God? the philosopher Plotinus equates sensible matter 

with primary evil or evil itself. For him, sensible matter is the part of otherness which is 

opposed to the things which in the full and proper sense exist, that is rational formative 

principles. It is a privation; evil lacks the characteristics of being. For Augustine, evil is a 

kind of non-being (privation). Basing his judgments on the Scriptures, he insisted that God 

created everything and everything is good. Evil is not a thing; hence it could not have been 

created. For Thomas Aquinas, God allows evil to exist in his presence so that he can create 

good from it. He subscribes to the theory of evil as a privation.  

In the modern period, it was David Hume who re-ignited interest in the problem of 

evil. In his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, he corroborated the argument of Epicurus 

on the question of God and evil. Scholars identify the problem of evil in Hume used as an 

evidential argument against the existence of God. Fyodor Dostoevsky imagines God as an 

architect of an edifice of human destiny with the goal of making people happy in the end but 

having it necessarily that a little child is unavoidably tortured. This fact, for him, questions 

especially the love of God. Albert Camus presented rebuttals to a variety of theodicies. For 

him the presence of human suffering shows the meaninglessness of human life which he 

often calls absurdity. J.L. Mackie notes that none of the proffered solutions to the problem of 

evil has been able to stand to criticism, hence, the logical problem of evil still stands and 

God’s existence is threatened. Alvin Plantinga argues that the freewill defense shows that the 

existence of God is compatible both logically and probabilistically with the existence of evil. 

Richard Swinburne argues that it is not evil to bring about bad (evil) states of affairs so long 

as certain conditions are satisfied. He suggested that they are satisfied in the case of the evils 

of this world, and so the evil of this world do not provide evidence against the existence of 

God. for Philip Quinn, God as an omnipotent and superlatively good moral agent, would 

actualize a world of unsurpassable moral goodness if he were to actualize a possible world. 

Eleonore Stump criticizes the arguments of Swinburne. He holds that natural evil is not 

justified by the value of knowledge necessary for serious exercise of freewill as Swinburne 

had suggested. William Hasker focused on the idea of gratuitous evil. His argument was that 

God would allow just those evils which are conducive to a greater good.  

 

The Theodicy: Leibniz’s Solution to the Problem of Evil 

Leibniz’s solution to the problem of evil is principally contained in the Theodicy 

which was written in 1710. However, some earlier works of Leibniz contain “patches” of 

arguments and demonstrations which together serve to bolster the chief argument of the 

Theodicy. In fact, the Theodicy is properly to be regarded a mature synthesis of the entire 

Leibnizian ideas regarding the problem of evil. The term or expression “theodicy” should be 

understood here in two senses: first, as the book written by Leibniz. Secondly, as Leibniz’s 

attempt to resolve the problem of evil.  

Leibniz’s solution to the problem of evil is expressed clearly in his effort at justifying 

the goodness (justice or righteousness) of God. considering the fact that in contemporary time 



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the problem of evil is regarded as an argument for atheism, his focus here was not to prove 

the existence of God since for him the existence of God was a certainty. Rather, he engages 

in proffering solution to the problem only because it has been taken as a drawback on the 

goodness of God. Consequently, his solution is expressed through his claim that this world 

created by God is the best possible world and through the principle of Sufficient Reason. 

 

The Best Possible World 

Leibniz’s solution to the problem of evil consists in the very resounding claim that 

this world as it is, is the best of all possible worlds. The world, tainted by evil, numerous 

kinds of evil, has been taken by many as argument against God’s holiness. The underachiever 

problem actually emphasizes this point. It contends that because there are several evils in the 

world, the world is therefore a very poor achievement on the part of a seemingly or allegedly 

perfect God. consequently, God is not fit to be loved or adored since he has allowed so much 

evil in the world he created. In response to this manner of thinking, Leibniz composes the 

Theodicy. What does he intend to achieve? 

Our end is to banish from men the false ideas that represent God to them as an 

absolute prince employing a despotic power, unfitted to be loved and 

unworthy of being loved. These notions are the more evil in relation to God 

inasmuch as the essence of piety is not only to fear him but also to love him 

above all things, and that cannot come about unless there be knowledge of his 

perfections capable of arousing the love which he deserves, and which makes 

the felicity of those that love him (Leibniz, 126).  

 

One thing that appears quite clear from the above passage is the fact that Leibniz has the goal 

of restoring in men’s heart the love for God. He observes that God is the first reason of 

things, everything else is contingent. He is the reason for the existence of the world (which is 

the whole assemblage of contingent things), he is necessary and eternal. 

Furthermore, he argues that this cause (reason) must be intelligent since the world 

being contingent and an infinity of other worlds being equally possible and having equal 

claim to existence with it, the cause of this world should have reference to all these possible 

worlds in order to choose one of them. The regard or relation of an existent substance to 

simple possibilities can be nothing other than the understanding which has the ideas of them, 

and to fix upon one of them (that is to choose one of them) can be nothing other than the act 

of the will which chooses. It is the power of the substance that renders its will efficacious. 

“power relates to being, wisdom or understanding to truth, and will to good. And this 

intelligent cause ought to be infinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in power, in wisdom, 

and in goodness, since it relates to all that which is possible” (Leibniz, 127). Now, since all is 

connected together, there is no ground for admitting more than one. The understanding of this 

intelligent cause is the source of essences, its will is the origin of existences. Through these 

few words, Leibniz claims to have proven the existence of the only God with his perfections.  

God in his supreme wisdom, Leibniz continues, which is united to a goodness that is no less 

infinite could not but have chosen the best. For as a lesser evil is a kind of good, even so a 

lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the way of a greater good, and there would be 

something to correct in the actions of God if it were possible to do better. He makes an 

allusion to Mathematics, as he often does – it is just like in mathematics where there is no 

maximum or minimum, in short nothing distinguished, everything is done equally, or when 

that is not possible nothing at all is done, so it may be said likewise in respect of perfect 

wisdom, which is no less orderly than mathematics, that if there were not the best (optimum) 

among all possible worlds, God would not have produced any. By “world” Leibniz means the 



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whole succession and the whole agglomeration of all existent things, lest it be said that 

several worlds could have existed in different times and in different places. everything put 

together must be reckoned as one world or one universe. Again, even though one should fill 

all times and all places, it still remains true that one might have filled them in innumerable 

ways, and that there is an infinitude of possible worlds among which God must have chosen 

the best, since he does nothing without acting in accordance with supreme reason (Leibniz, 

128).  

 

The Principle of Sufficient Reason 

As stated earlier, the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) is a central principle of the 

philosophical system of Leibniz. Leibniz used this principle as a response to the argument of 

those who hold that God was not under any obligation to create the best world. Leibniz 

rejected this position on the basis of this principle. According to this principle, for any state 

of affairs, there must be a sufficient reason that explains why that state of affairs and not 

some other state of affairs obtains (Leibniz, 209). With regards to our world therefore, there 

must be some reason that explains why it, and some other world, obtains. Now, there can be 

no such reason if it is the case that the goodness of worlds increase ad infinitum. Hence, in 

order for the principle of sufficient reason to stand, Leibniz concludes that there can be no 

infinite continuum of worlds. The idea of sufficient reason is clearly expressed in his 

conceptual containment theory of truth as can be seen in his 1686 letter to Arnauld: 

In every true affirmative proposition, whether necessary or contingent, 

universal or particular, the notion of the predicate is in some way included in 

that of the subject. Predicatum inest subject, otherwise I do not know what 

truth is … for there must always be some foundation for the connection 

between the terms of a proposition, and this must be found in their concepts. 

This is my great principle, with which I believe all philosophers should agree, 

and one of whose corollaries is the commonly held axiom that nothing 

happens without a reason which can always be given, why the thing has 

happened as it did rather than in another way, even though this reason often 

inclines without necessitating (Leibniz, 337).  

 

Critics may argue against this principle by stating that this principle could still stand even if 

there were an infinite continuum of good worlds. In this case then, God’s decree that this 

world should be actual would be the reason. Leibniz rejects this view because in his opinion 

this response would only push the problem back because the principle of sufficient reason 

applies to free choices just as it applies to any other event or state of affairs. Hence, there is a 

need to provide a sufficient reason for God’s choice of this world instead of some other world 

on the continuum of morally acceptable worlds. Leibniz observes that it seems such a 

sufficient reason cannot be given on the infinite continuum of good worlds view. This is so 

because the sufficient reason cannot be derived from some feature or fact about the world that 

is actually chosen, for this would raise the obvious question: why this feature in particular 

serve as the sufficient reason for God’s choice? Leibniz concludes that the only possible 

answer this question would be: (a) because God arbitrarily selected that feature as the one he 

would favour in deciding which world to create; or (b) because that feature made that world 

better than its competitors. Neither of these answers is acceptable. The first is inconsistent 

with the principle of sufficient reason. The second is incompatible with the hypothesis at 

issue – that there is no best world (Leibniz, 138).  

 

 



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Leibniz’s Theodicy and the Question of God’s Omnipotence 

 Although Leibniz’s work in the Theodicy is as fascinating as it is compelling, it is not 

without some basic weaknesses. One may rationally hold on to the divine attributes of 

omnibenevolence and omniscience, it is quite difficult to maintain that God is indeed all-

powerful considering the kind of world man finds himself in and the idea of God that theists 

always put forth. There is an obvious conflict between the qualities of omnibenevolence and 

omnipotence. In fact, it is precisely due to the attribute of benevolence that God’s 

omnipotence is brought into question. Leibniz’s solution does not seem to have satisfactorily 

answered the question of evil. This is because the conclusion of Leibniz still leaves room for 

a very important question with regards to God’s omnipotence.  

In his response to the Socinians, Leibniz affirms that it is God’s omnipotence which makes 

him able to create the best possible world. Now, the concept of omnipotence leaves no room 

for inadequacies of insufficiencies. Neither does it leave room for excuses or limitations. 

Omnipotence is an absolute concept. The ordinary understanding of this term is quite in line 

with what many theists think when they use it with regards to God. The general conception of 

this term immediately gives one an impression of boundlessness. That is, there is no limit to 

what an omnipotent being can do. Hence, if an omnipotent being has a specific nature, it is 

rational to expect that this omnipotent being would act boundlessly in accordance with this 

nature.  

However, Leibniz maintains that in some occasions God condones some evil in order that 

good, or greater good might come from them. This is an indication of limitation of the power 

of God. In other words, his omnipotence should provide him the option to create good 

without evil and to create greater good without needing the cooperation or support of lesser 

evil. Does this not seem to suggest that there is a limit to what an omnipotent being can do? 

Or does omnipotence refer to something else rather than the “all-powerfulness” that theists 

often ascribe to God? By submitting to the seeming necessity of allowing some evil to occur 

so that some greater good (which is his own motive) will follow is a subjection to domain of 

boundaries or helplessness. It appears that God is in such a position that sometimes human 

beings find themselves – a position in which you have to allow something you do not want, 

or pass through some experience you do not like or approve of just so you can achieve 

another goal which is your original intention. In order to address this challenge, this study 

maintains that the all-good and all-knowing God is not all-powerful, and this does not deny 

him his right as creator and sustainer of the world.  

 

Evaluation 

 Leibniz tends to justify the presence of evil in the world by considering it as a necessary part 

of the Best Possible World. This justification may not be satisfactory in equal proportion to 

everyone. The theist may find it meaningful. But whether he would continue to find it 

meaningful when confronted with the harsh realities of life remains to be seen. The atheist 

may see no sense in this justification. This does not in any way exempt him from rational 

puzzle faced by the human mind when suffering is involved. The philosopher may find the 

submission unsatisfactory for several reasons. One reason may be that the very existence of a 

God is still a matter of controversy for him. Another reason would be that even if there were 

a God, Leibniz’s reason of universal harmony is not satisfying because it would seem to 

human reason that an infinitely powerful God should be able to bring about a universal 

harmony without allowing evil and suffering. Not only does this fact question God’s power, it 

also questions his goodness. If he is indeed infinitely good, he should find a way to prioritize 

the happiness of his creatures by excluding evil and suffering from the pre-established 

universal harmony. Furthermore, the existence of evil and suffering in the world continue to 



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have unwelcome consequences with regards to God’s existence, or the belief in God. Human 

rationality will continue to probe and doubt, at least to some extent, the credibility of the 

claim of God’s existence in the world that is pervaded by so much pain and suffering.  

 

Conclusion 

The theodicy of Leibniz is undoubtedly a worthwhile enterprise. It is significant to 

take note of the fact that his philosophical training was chiefly scholastic in nature. This fact 

is obviously expressed in style and in the subjects with which he concerned himself. One 

should not overlook the period in which Leibniz undertook this project. It was a time when 

the Church was still yielding a lot of power and the internal conflicts in the Church were 

actually matters of general concern. His efforts were therefore timely and helpful. The best 

possible world theory and the principle of sufficient reason are key expressions of Leibniz’s 

rationalist orientation. He was keen to show the powers of the human reason and what it is 

capable of achieving.  

Human suffering is not arbitrary after all. God is not a despotic king who dispenses 

goods and evils arbitrarily, who damns and saves without any reason. God acts in accordance 

with supreme reason and so anything he allows to take place in the world, he allows for a 

reason. So, human suffering, in all its dimensions, take place with a sufficient reason for their 

occurrence. God, due to his nature, would not allow any evil except there is a greater good 

which will issue from it. However, this position that God, due to his nature would not allow 

any evil except there is a greater good which will issue from it is quite problematic in that it 

shows some form of limitation of the power of God. the fact that an all-Good God would 

allow some evil to occur so that from it he can achieve greater good is an indication that “all-

powerfulness” is wrongly attributed to him.  This study concludes therefore, that the 

affirmation of a God who is all-good and all-knowing but not all-powerful explains the 

existence of evil in the world.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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